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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Kendall Q. Northern, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. Eldon Barnes, et al., 
Respondent. 
Case No. 920116 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1992) which grants the Utah 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals." Mr. Northern's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on October 28, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern presents the following 
questions for review: 
I. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that habeas 
corpus relief was not available to Petitioner and that Foote v. 
Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), did not apply to 
Petitioner's claims that the Board of Pardons failed to provide him 
procedural or substantive due process? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals err by refusing to address 
the question of whether the Board of Pardons violated its own 
procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due 
process of law? 
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this 
Court accords the lower court's statement of law, statutory 
interpretation, or legal conclusions no particular deference. The 
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 
464,465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
A. United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
B. Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7. No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. 
C. Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 9. 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fine 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
D. Utah Code Ann. Section 77-27-5 (3) (1992): 
Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of 
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sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or 
forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial 
review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining 
or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
Other rules or statutes are set forth in the body of the 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case originally was an appeal from the trial court's 
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or Writ of 
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Northern filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
and/or Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment on March 30, 
1990, seeking to have certain actions of the Board of Pardons 
declared unlawful and to have the trial court order that he be 
placed on parole. (R.2) 
On July 27, 1990, trial was held, at which time the court 
heard testimony, accepted documentary and deposition evidence, and 
heard the arguments of counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, 
the court took the matter under advisement. On September 26, 1990, 
the trial court convened the parties and from the bench denied 
Northern's petition. On December 7, 1990, the trial court entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal, 
(R. 89) a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
Petitioner appealed, claiming: (1) the Board of Pardons 
violated its own procedural and substantive rules, thereby denying 
Northern due process of law, (2) the term "new evidence" as used in 
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Rule 3.10 should be given its plain and literal meaning and, given 
that meaning, there was no new evidence which justified rescission 
of Northern's parole date, (3) principles of due process require 
that Northern be given notice of the evidence relied on and the 
reasons for the rescission of his parole date, (4) the Board of 
Pardons's actions constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (5) 
the court should order Northern's immediate parole. 
On January 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court's denial of the writ, holding that habeas corpus is not 
available as a remedy in this case to modify the release date 
ordered by the Board of Pardons, Northern was afforded full 
procedural due process by the Board in its rescission of his parole 
date, and decisions related to the setting of parole dates are not 
subject to judicial review. Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). A copy of the court's opinion is attached as 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, Northern was convicted 
by guilty plea of second degree murder and aggravated robbery, both 
first degree felonies. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life 
sentences at the Utah State Prison. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal ("Findings of Fact") No. 
1. (R. 89) These pleas arose out of the homicide of a Salt Lake 
City cab driver who was shot to death during the course of an armed 
robbery. The co-defendant, Robert Alan Phillips, who was then 
twenty-six years old, admitted to police and the evidence confirmed 
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that he alone had shot the victim. He claimed that Northern had 
encouraged the second and third shots; Northern denied that 
allegation. 90 day Diagnostic Evaluation, Exhibit 18 to Paul Boyden 
deposition. Northern, who was seventeen years old at the time of 
the crime, had participated in the armed robbery and was present 
when the cab driver was shot by Phillips; he testified against 
Phillips at the preliminary hearing. Plaintiff's Exhibit 18, p. 2, 
of deposition of Paul Boyden. Subsequently Phillips pled guilty to 
capital homicide and was sentenced to life in prison. 
On July 8, 1981, a year after his arrival at the prison, 
Mr. Northern had an initial hearing before the Board of Pardons, 
which determined that Mr. Northern would be paroled from the Utah 
State Prison on May 10, 1988. Findings of Fact No. 2. (R. 90) 
During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr. 
Northern had had a drug problem and that he had abused drugs during 
the first two years of his incarceration. Findings of Fact No. 3. 
(R. 90) On September 24, 1984, the Board of Pardons considered Mr. 
Northern's incarceration status, pursuant to a written request for 
a reconsideration of his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 11. (R. 
92) Accompanying the request was a caseworker's recommendation to 
shorten Northern's term of incarceration. The Board of Pardons 
determined that Northern's parole date of May 10, 1988, should 
remain intact. Findings of Fact No. 4. (R. 90) 
In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the 
Duchesne County Jail. He gained trusty status and during the next 
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two years worked outside of the jail. Frequently this was 
unsupervised work, including substantial periods of time when he 
labored on the farm of the elderly mother of the jail lieutenant. 
At another location he helped construct a fire station. During 
this extended trusty period there were no reported instances of 
misconduct within the community and no attempts to escape. 
Findings of Fact No. 5. (R. 91) Plaintiff's Exhibit #23x to the 
deposition of Board of Pardons member Paul Boyden, attached as 
Addendum C.2 
On February 25, 1988, jail authorities learned that an 
inmate had brought some marijuana into the jail and had given a 
small amount to Northern. Northern admitted that he had smoked 
part of a marijuana cigarette. Defendant's Exhibit #41, p. 19 of 
Defendant's Exhibit 33. This fact was timely reported to the Utah 
State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of Pardons 
sometime prior to May 10, 1988. Findings of Fact No. 6. (R. 91) 
Despite this minor infraction, the Duchesne County 
Sheriff and the Duchesne jail commander wrote a letter on March 22, 
1988, to the chair of the Board of Pardons in support of Northern's 
desire to be paroled to his home state of Arizona upon his May 10 
release. Their letter commended Northern for the "substantial 
XA11 exhibits referred to in Petitioner's brief were received 
and their admission is not the subject of any controversy. The 
record page showing the offer and receipt of exhibits is attached 
as Addendum D. 
2Mr. Boyden's deposition and the exhibits attached thereto 
were received by stipulation of the parties and considered by the 
court in lieu of live testimony. P. 16 of transcript of proceedings 
of July 27, 1990. 
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progress" he had made during his two years in Duchesne. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #22 to Deposition of Paul Boyden, attached as Addendum E. 
Northern had communications with Paul Larsen of the Board 
of Pardons prior to May 10, 1988, as attempts to work out the 
details of an intensive supervision parole were made.3 His April 
1988 letter outlined his reasons for wanting to be paroled to 
Arizona, although he indicated he would accept whatever parole 
conditions that were required of him, whether in Utah or Arizona. 
Northern letter to the Board, Defendant's Exhibit #22, attached as 
Addendum G. See also Transcript of April 19 hearing, p. 7. 
Arizona had agreed to supervise Northern but insisted 
that its parole unit determine the kind of supervision Northern 
needed. Utah was unwilling to trust Arizona to make that decision. 
Northern's only family in Utah lived in Moab, but Intensive 
Supervision Parole (ISP) was not available there. Where ISP was 
available Northern had no family or friends and the various 
psychological reports had indicated that family support would be 
essential to Northern's success on parole. Defendant's Exhibits 
#15, 24. The May 11, 1988, supplemental psychological report of Dr. 
Carlisle, described more fully below, concurred in the need for 
3In the 1988 Board's determination that Northern should be on 
ISP, it had received during its decision-making process a document 
dated January 21, 1988, from the ISP supervisor and a correctional 
technician, that recommended Northern's placement on ISP. Attached 
as Addendum F, the document falsely stated that "the subject shot 
and killed a cab driver for $26.00 in cash." Plaintiff's Exhibit 
#2 to Boyden deposition. The influence this document had in the 
May 9 recision decision is unknown, since Northern was never 
provided a copy of the document and had no recision hearing at that 
time. 
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family presence and support. 
The communications between Northern and Larsen included 
a Special Attention Hearing at the prison on April 19, 1988. After 
the hearing Mr. Larsen recommended the following additions to 
Northern's 1981 parole agreement: (1) Complete Intensive 
Supervision Parole if available in Utah (2) Suggest maximum level 
of supervision in receiving state (3) Random urinalysis (4) 
Complete mental health therapy (5) Maintain full time employment or 
full time student status and (7) maintain nighttime (7:00 p.m.) 
curfew for first six months. Defendant's Exhibit #23, attached as 
Addendum H. 
The intention of the unidentified chairperson and Mr. 
Larsen was to give the Board alternative courses of conduct: to 
either require Northern to remain in Utah and complete ISP or to 
permit him to parole to Arizona, where its highest level of 
supervision was recommended. Tr. of April 19 hearing, p. 9. 
Neither at that time nor at any later time was Northern's 
possession of a small amount of marijuana in February 1988 raised 
as an allegation of misconduct that would interfere with his parole 
date. Deposition of Paul W. Boyden, dated July 6, 1990. 
On May 5, 1988, Dr. Al Carlisle, the Utah State Prison 
psychologist and Dr. Ted Brandhurst, the associate prison 
psychologist, conducted and filed a psychological evaluation on Mr. 
Northern at the request of the Board of Pardons. Unbeknownst to 
Northern, the 1988 Board had made the request to determine his 
suitability for release on parole. During the evaluative 
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interview, Northern candidly disclosed and discussed his prior drug 
abuse, which had begun at age sixteen. He insisted that he needed 
to continue drug therapy while on parole, in addition to any mental 
health therapy ordered by the Board. Defendant's Exhibit 24, 
attached as Addendum I. 
Drs. Carlisle and Brandhurst noted that Northern 
presented himself as "articulate, intelligent and well-read", a 
presentation consistent with earlier testing that showed Northern 
to have a superior intellect. While at the prison Northern 
completed his Associate of Arts degree in Business and took three 
technical training courses offered by the prison. The psychologists 
also reviewed his prison jacket regarding disciplinary write-ups 
and noted that he was reported by the Duchesne County Jail staff to 
be a model inmate. 
The psychologists also administered three standardized 
tests to Northern and concluded that he was "honest in answering 
test questions and tended to be overly truthful." Defendantf s 
Exhibit 24. They found that: 
Northern has shown a great deal of growth and 
maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this 
maturing may be due to age, but an important aspect of 
his growth can be attributed to the social interactions 
and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at 
the Duchesne County Jail. He has been given more 
responsibility and respect than at any other time of his 
life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a 
responsible adult. 
Mr. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this 
time. His major problem is his capacity to deal with 
life's stresses without the use of illegal substances. 
He fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address 
drug issues as part of his parole agreement. 
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Although Mr. Northern can be physically and verbally 
imposing, he does not appear to have the capacity for 
violent acting out. He can be argumentative and 
assertive, but responds to authority when necessary. 
It is this writer's recommendation that Mr. Northern, if 
he is paroled, be placed in a supportive environment such 
as family or friends to make transition to society as 
uneventful as possible. It is strongly recommended that, 
in addition to any mental health treatment, Mr. Northern 
receive drug abuse counseling. 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS, 
THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED AS A FAVORABLE ONE." (Emphasis 
in original.) May 5, 1988, psychological report of Drs. 
Carlisle and Brandhurst. 
In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies in 
effect which governed its actions and proceedings, including Rule 
3.10 which, in pertinent part, read as follows: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the Board of 
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written referral 
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and 
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections 
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would 
present a serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date, 
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the 
basis for the rescission hearing. Upon receipt of such 
information, the offender will be scheduled for a rescission 
hearing. Except under extraordinary circumstances, the 
offender will be notified of all allegations and the date of 
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance. 
Findings of Fact No. 12. (R.93) The full text is attached as 
Addendum J. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons rejected the 
recommendation of its hearing officer, Paul Larsen, and without any 
further discussion with no notice to Kendall Northern, rescinded 
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his May 10, 1988, parole release date. Findings of Fact No. 13. 
(R. 93) The Board notified the Duchesne jail commander by telephone 
that it had rescinded Northern's parole date. 
Prior to the May 9, 1988, rescission, Northern was not 
notified of any allegations relating to the rescission and the 
Board of Pardons did not hold any kind of hearing. Northern was 
not even informed that the Board was considering rescission of his 
parole date. In a document detailing the rescission, the Board of 
Pardons made the following remark: "Continue for another 
psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report." 
Findings of Fact No. 13. (R. 93) 
On May 11, 1988, Dr. Carlisle conducted another 
psychological interview with Northern and administered another 
battery of psychological tests. The results of the five new tests, 
the personal history inventory, and the interview were the same as 
the testing done six days earlier: 
"This test battery did not reflect any aggressive or hostile 
tendencies toward self or others. . .His situation has been 
thoroughly thought through in that he has anticipated the need 
for a support system and employment. . .His parents 
demonstrate concern and support. . .It is also recommended 
that Ken be placed close to a family support system to better 
enable him to cope with his job, expenses, and stress. His 
parents in Arizona appear to be the logical choice for a short 
period of time, and they are willing and anxious to help." May 
11 Supplemental Psychological Report, Plaintiff's Exhibit #13 
to Boyden deposition. 
On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a 
hearing for July 8, 1988, to review Northern's status. Findings of 
Fact No. 15. (R. 94) The hearing was designated by the Board as a 
Special Attention Hearing, not a Rescission Hearing. The Board 
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requested its staff to notify the family of the victim of the July 
8 hearing. Defendant's Exhibit 27. Plaintiff's Exhibits 7, 8, and 
9 of Boyden deposition. #9 is attached as Addendum K. At that 
hearing on July 8, 1988, Northern was permitted to address the 
Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to respond 
to questioning from the Board. Findings of Fact No. 16. (R. 94) 
Northern's request to have counsel, David Bown, present 
at the July hearing was denied. His request to discover the 
psychological reports was also denied. Defendant's Exhibits 29, 
30, and 31. #31 is attached as Addendum L. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Board of Pardons affirmed the rescission of 
Northern's May 10, 1988, parole release date based upon his "risk 
to society" and the need for "appropriate punishment," and 
rescheduled a rehearing for May 1990. Findings of Fact No. 17. (R. 
94) 
The first portion of Northern's July 8 hearing was 
devoted to the Board's review of and reconsideration of the 1980 
robbery and homicide. Questions were put to Northern about his 
participation. The co-defendant's twenty year rehearing date was 
noted by the chairperson. Tr. of July 8 hearing, pp. 1-9. The 
next portion was a review of Northern's juvenile and institutional 
history, especially drug and alcohol use and their relationship to 
the robbery/homicide, including the matters considered by the 1981 
Board and the 1984 Board that kept intact his 1988 release date. 
Tr. of July 8 hearing, pp.10-21. The next segment focused on some 
of the psychological information generated since 1980 and whether 
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Northern's statements about the crime to the 1981 Board are 
inconsistent with his statements to the 1988 Board, i.e., whether 
his involvement was a product of his immaturity or his drug usage. 
Tr. of July hearing, pp. 23-26.4 
During the course of the hearing, Board members made 
statements pertinent to issues before the court: 
"Chairperson 5: Now, you understand that the board is 
extremely concerned about anyone who's involved in this kind 
of a crime, particularly to the public. And there are other 
concerns too, you know, whether justice is served by the 
amount of time which is spent. Those are all things that 
we're concerned about, of course. And the board has taken a 
long hard look at it." Tr. July 8, p. 10. 
"Ms. Palacios: I'm at four different theoretical places, four 
different approaches. . . [t]he conclusions that come from 
each of the four. . .is that you should not be free. . . 
"First of all, your behavior since this board saw you in 1981 
(reviews four c-notes from 1982-1985). The acknowledgement by 
you that drugs were a consequence, were part of the reason for 
your committing the crime." 
"That tells me that there is sufficient new information about 
your behavior that relates to your dangerousness on the street 
that requires this board to rescind your date." Tr. July 8, 
p.26. 
"Ms. Palacios: Second approach is one that has to do simply 
with a perception of dangerousness about us, having nothing to 
do with anything that occurred after 1981, but rather focusing 
on you as an individual and the crime." Tr. July 8, p. 27. 
References were made by the chairperson to his 1981 Board 
hearing. Ms. Palacios was a member of both Boards. The Board had 
at some unknown time destroyed or lost the tape recording of that 
hearing, rendering it unavailable to Northern for his July 8 
hearing or subsequent judicial proceedings. 
5The Chairperson is never identified in the transcript. 
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MMs. Palacios: The third approach. . . is just whether in 
fact we had all of the relevant information at the time of the 
hearing. And I'm not sure, you say you told us about the . . 
drug problem. The fourth and final approach that I've taken 
is the just deniable (sic in original) approach. It's the 
notion—we have your fall partner in here on a 25 year 
rehearing. It's the notion that even though the Hambys are 
not here today, seven children grew up without their father, 
and you had a critical part in his death. And that to release 
you after only eight years is to depreciate the value of this 
life and ignore the impact on the Hambys." Tr. July 8, p. 29. 
"Chairperson: Mr. Northern, I think my major concern . . . 
looking back on it, for a long time the major comment that was 
made by any report that was written early, it was that you 
just didn't seem to care about anybody, that in fact during 
the course of lots and lots of interviews, that you never 
expressed that you cared at all about the death of the victim 
or these seven children who lost their father and a woman who 
lost her husband." Tr. July 8, pp. 31-32. 
Mr. Northern closed the informational part of the hearing 
with this response, provided in pertinent part: 
"Even early on I did feel remorse for what had happened. I 
didn't show it. I played the tough guy all the way through 
and didn't let anybody see anything. But I have always had 
remorse about what happened and I have to relive it all the 
time. It's me that had to go through this all the time, of 
what I could have done to stop it is I could have stopped it. 
. . .I'm sorry for what happened. I was out of control; I 
know that. . .1 realize that seven kids had to grow up without 
their dad. . .1 can't change what happened. I know that. But 
I can go out and I can succeed and I can make my life better 
and maybe I can help somebody else along the line somewhere to 
help make up for what I did. I've done eight years in prison; 
I was 17 when I came in. I've grown up in prison. I've 
matured in prison. . .I've lived in here with a snitch jacket 
for all that time. . .I've shown, especially in the last two 
or three years where I've been out at Duchesne county jail 
that I have changed". Tr. July 8, pp. 33-34. 
After a recess the Chairperson stated: 
"Mr. Northern, as we explained earlier, the board is extremely 
concerned about first of all, the risk that you present to 
society from the overall record, from the nature of the crime 
and specifically also including the information which the 
board has received since that time and in comparing it with 
the overall record. We also have concern as to the—as to the 
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appropriate punishment for this seriousness of this kind of 
crime. We affirm the rescission of the parole date of May 
10th of 1988 and we order a rehearing in May of 1990. That's 
an additional two years." Tr. July 8 p.36. 
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief during his 
term of incarceration.6 That petition was denied. During the 
appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition/ Northern was 
paroled. As a new condition of parole, that was not part of his 
1981 or 1988 parole agreements, the Board required Northern to pay 
$26,350.00 in restitution. 825 P.2d at 698. Northern currently 
remains on parole in the state of Arizona, the state to which he 
was permitted to go upon his release from the Utah State Prison in 
July 1991. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that habeas corpus 
relief was not available to Northern and that Foote v. Utah Board 
of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) did not apply to his claims 
that the Board of Pardons failed to provide him procedural or 
substantive due process. The lower appellate court's sua sponte 
transformation of the important issues in this case related to the 
Board of Pardons's exercise of power, its accountability therefor, 
eAfter the Board ordered the two year rehearing for Northern, 
he was returned to trusty status at the Duchesne County Jail. Some 
months later, when he was notified that the prison had ordered that 
he be returned the following day to the Point of the Mountain 
facility to serve out his time there—to the same facility in which 
the co-defendant was serving his sentence--Northern walked away. 
He was apprehended in 1990, charged with and convicted of escape, 
and returned to the Utah State Prison. None of the issues or 
argument presented within this brief consider that charge or 
conviction. 
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and the due process rights of inmates subject to that power, into 
a simplistic, illogical claim of credit for time served was an 
improper, avoidance response to Foote. Even though Northern was 
pardoned a year and a half ago, he is entitled to an appellate 
review and determination of the lawfulness of his incarceration 
post May 10, 1988, and to an declaration of the nullity of certain 
actions taken by the Board regarding his 1991 parole agreement. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in refusing to address 
the issues of whether the Board of Pardons violated its own 
procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due 
process of law. Without any analysis or citation to any cases for 
support, it abruptly and succinctly concluded: "Since Northern was 
afforded full procedural due process by the July 8, 1988, hearing, 
any of the alleged procedural deficiencies in rescinding his 
original parole date were remedied before this petition was filed." 
Such conclusion was error. Subsequent tidying up by the Board 
cannot rectify the trampling of rights to due process. In refusing 
to address the underlying issues, the Court of Appeals compounded 
its error and this Court must now review for the first time the 
conclusions of the trial court. 
Finally, this Court's consideration of the legal 
conclusions of the trial court will clearly indicate that the trial 
court erred in several ways. In so doing the Court should find 
that the Board of Pardons violated its own prbcedural and 
substantive rules, thereby denying Northern due process of law. 
After a review of all of the evidence, the court will have an 
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abiding conviction that Northern's parole date was rescinded 
because the Board believed the crime he committed in 1980 deserved 
more years of incarceration than the Board in 1980 had ordered. 
The Court should find that when the term "new evidence" 
is given its plain and literal meaning, there was no new evidence 
that warranted a finding that Northern, who had been a trusty 
working outside of a county jail for two years, would be a serious 
risk or danger to the community. 
Such review ought also conclude that Northern should have 
been given notice of the evidence relied upon by the Board in its 
May 9 rescission of his parole date. Additional information 
developed between May 9 and the July 9 hearing, such as the 
testimony of Northern at the hearing, cannot provide the 
justification for a May 9 decision to rescind. The actions of the 
Board of Pardons constituted cruel and unusual punishment in its 
permitting Northern's parole date to stand for two thousand four 
hundred eighty two days and on the day before he was to be paroled 
to revoke it without notice and without basis, other than its view 
that the earlier Board should have given him more time and that 
release in 1988 would denigrate the life of the victim. 
As a consequence of the errors made by the Court of 
Appeals and by the trial court, this Court should reverse the 
holding of the Court of Appeals, identify the due process rights 
and violations at issue in this case that Foote left undefined, and 
hold that Northern's incarceration after May 10, 1988, was 
unlawful. As a result the Court should order deleted from his 1991 
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parole agreement the restitution order as it was improvidently 
added in 1991. Had he been timely paroled, such restitution order, 
which is in any event factually unsupportable, would not have been 
part of his parole conditions. In addition, the Court should order 
the termination of his parole in July 1993 in consideration of the 
unlawful actions of the Board in May and July 1988. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO PETITIONER. 
When the Court of Appeals held that "habeas corpus is not 
available in this case as a post-release remedy to modify the 
release date ordered by the Board," it rendered a decision in 
conflict with decisions of this Court and decided an important 
question of state law which should be and now will be settled by 
this Court. Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(b) and (d). Because of the 
importance of the Court of Appeals' action and potential impact on 
numerous cases beyond this case, this Court has, in granting 
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, decided to review the action 
of the Court of Appeals and consider issues regarding the 
accountability of the Board of Pardons that recent Utah Supreme 
Court cases have noted but not had an appropriate opportunity to 
fully examine. 
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991), this Court specifically held that "there is no question that 
habeas corpus review of the Board of Pardon's action is available." 
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The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case sidestepped Foote by 
mischaracterizing the nature of Mr. Northern's claims. Had the 
Court of Appeals addressed the issues raised (as stated below), the 
Court could have reached no other conclusion than that Foote 
applied to this case. 
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1990) provided a 
retrospective of the writ of habeas corpus and the observation that 
"the writ provided a judicial means for securing the liberty of a 
person restrained by arbitrary or oppressive power." Hurst at 
1033. It specifically recognized the writ of habeas corpus as a 
necessary tool of the judiciary so it can be "armed with process 
sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government*" 
Hurst at 1033. 
In its designation of Northern's due process claim as 
merely a claim that the Board should have credited Northern's 
parole period with the additional years he served beyond his 
original parole date, the Court of Appeals improperly manipulated 
and characterized the claims to reach its conclusion that a writ is 
not available. 
Northern did not ask the Board to give him credit for 
time served. Northern did not ask the trial court to give him 
credit for time served. His grievance was and is that the Board of 
Pardons should have paroled him on May 10, 1988, and that all of 
his detention after that date was contrary to the policies and 
procedures of the Board of Pardons and to constitutional notions of 
due process. His remedy sought from the trial court was a 
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declaration that his post May 10, 1988, detention was unlawful and 
his immediate release on parole. 
Once he was paroled (after the filing of his brief to the 
Utah Court of Appeals), the remedy sought was a finding that the 
Board of Pardons had violated its policies and procedures in 
rescinding his parole date, that his continued incarceration after 
May 10, 1988, violated his due process rights secured by the Utah 
and United States Constitutions and was unlawful, and that, 
therefore, the new conditions of parole placed on him in 1991 were 
null and void. Chief among those new conditions was a restitution 
order of $26,350.00, compensation ordered for the wrongful death of 
the victim and the wholly speculative cost of child care for the 
Hamby children, had Mrs. Hamby needed child care. (The information 
provided in 1980 was that she was beginning to provide child care 
as a source of income, not that she paid child care. ) See 1991 
parole agreement and p. 4 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 to Boyden 
deposition. 
The Court of Appeals erred in analogizing this set of 
facts to an inmate's claim for credit for time served in a county 
jail while awaiting trial. While Northern has argued that his 
period of parole should be shortened by the length of his sentence 
that was unlawful, that claim is based on a violation of his 
constitutional rights, not because he was unable to make bail like 
the defendant in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988), 
who was held in jail prior to his conviction because of a parole 
hold placed on him. The pertinent question before the lower 
20 
appellate court was how it should treat the consequences of an 
unlawful period of incarceration. By failing to apply Foote v. 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the Court of Appeals 
compounded the error because it refused to examine the claimed 
violations of substantive and procedural due process, superficially 
concluding that any procedural errors were remedied later and that 
substantive due process claims would not be considered at all. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT FOOTE DID NOT 
AUTHORIZE THE JUDICIAL REVIEW REQUESTED. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that habeas corpus is 
not available to Mr. Northern, and its disregard of the violation 
of the substantive and procedural due process rights of Mr. 
Northern (whose parole date was wrongfully rescinded through both 
procedural defects and lack of legitimate basis), is inconsistent 
with this Court's opinion in Foote that: "It is the province of 
the judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of due process 
by an arm of government be heard and, if justified, that it be 
vindicated.,f Foote at 4. 
Northern presented the first opportunity since Foote for 
appellate review of specific Board of Pardons procedures regarding 
the interpretation and significance of its rules regarding 
rescission of an inmate's parole date — and the extent to which an 
inmate is entitled to due process, including notice and a hearing, 
in such Board action. Foote anticipated the flushing out of such 
due process requirements in future cases. 
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Northern recognizes the discretion of the Board of 
Pardons to set whatever initial release or rehearing date it wants, 
as long as the date is within the parameters of the sentence 
imposed by the court. The Board in 1981 could have set his release 
date for 2000—or beyond. The questions to be decided in this case 
concern what rights an inmate has when the Board seeks to rescind 
an established parole date. Because an inmate has a liberty 
interest in that parole date, that date cannot be taken away except 
for cause, notice, and an opportunity to be heard. 
In other words, while the Board can be arbitrary in the 
setting of the original parole date, it cannot later arbitrarily 
rescind that date just because it determines that the parole date 
no longer represents enough punishment, that today's society and 
today's Board want longer sentences, and that the sentencing 
guidelines in effect in 1988 recommend longer sentences. It cannot 
substitute its judgement for the Board which, in some cases, may 
have set a parole date twenty-five years earlier; such second 
guessing is not good cause to justify rescission of a parole date, 
although Board of Pardons member Paul Boyden believes it to be so 
and has testified that the Board can at any time prior to the 
moment an inmate walks out of the prison gates detain him and give 
him more time. Dep. of Paul Boyden, p. 77 
District courts around the state are taking increasingly 
assertive actions toward the Board of Pardons, which continues to 
claim that under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1992) its actions are 
beyond judicial review. In December 1991 the Third District Court 
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in Rawlinas v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 910905068, ordered 
the Board to give Rawlings post-conviction, pre-commitment credit 
for time served. In February 1992 the Third District Court in 
Smith v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 910903060, considered via 
a writ, Smith's claim that the Board had ignored the order of 
Fourth District Court Judge Boyd Park that Smith be given 626 days 
credit for post-conviction time served prior to his commitment to 
prison. (Addendum M). In soundly criticizing the Board, Judge 
David Young wrote: "This entire area of law allows the Board of 
Pardons to engage in discriminatory practices that jeopardizes the 
credibility of the Board...." A third case with similar claims, 
Jensen v. the Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 920901144CV, is now 
pending in the Third District Court. Whether discriminatory 
practices occur at the front end of a sentence because of the 
Board's unlawful practices or at the back end (in its refusal to 
honor parole dates set by earlier Boards just because its present 
members believe that the crime inherently demanded a longer 
incarceration), appellate courts must decide the parameters of the 
Board's discretion to act in these areas. The Court of Appeals' 
decision in this case is a retrenchment from this Court's opinion 
in Foote. 
Again, in its brief (one page) analysis of the claims, 
the Court of Appeals, through Judge Bench, reached the indefensible 
conclusion that Northern presents a case of application for credit 
for time served, not a petition for a declaration that Northern's 
incarceration post May 10, 1988, was unlawful and that consequences 
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dependent upon the legality of that incarceration are null and 
void. 
Despite the compelling language of Foote that the Board 
of Pardons must provide due process to prison inmates, and that 
violations must be vindicated because of protections under the 
habeas corpus, open courts, and due process provisions of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions, the lower appellate court looked 
at Foote only in light of the fictionalized "credit for time serve" 
claim and refused to consider its application in the due process 
claims* In misconstruing important claims that will continue to 
arise in inmate relationships with the Board of Pardons, it merely 
held, without any analysis at all, that the July 8 hearing remedied 
any due process errors, if there were any errors. 
POINT III 
NORTHERN WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS IN THE RESCISSION OF HIS MAY 1988 
PAROLE DATE AND THE JULY 1988 AFFIRMATION OF THE RESCISSION. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Northern asserted 
inter alia: (1) that the Board of Pardons denied him due process 
because it violated its own procedural and substantive rules, (2) 
that the trial court erred which it applied an unusual definition 
to the term "new evidence" as used in Rule 3.10 of the Board's 
rules and that, if a plain and literal meaning had been given to 
the term, there was no "new evidence" to justify the Board's 
rescission of Northern's parole date, and (3) that Mr. Northern was 
not given notice of the evidence and reasons for the Board's 
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rescission of his parole date. In its opinion the Court of Appeals 
addressed none of these issues, opting instead to state that the 
issues were "without merit" or lumping them into the one sentence 
analysis that the July proceedings fixed everything. 825 P.2d 699. 
In so holding the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings. Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(c). 
In order to function legitimately and effectively, the Board of 
Pardons is subject to certain rules and regulations which govern 
its actions and proceedings. In May 1988 the Board of Pardons 
operated under Rule 3.10, the 1988 version of which is set out in 
the Statement of Facts. That rule set out the Board's policies and 
procedures regarding the setting and the rescinding of a parole 
date and of the necessity of giving an inmate notice of a 
rescission hearing and the opportunity to be heard before a 
rescission occurs. Findings of Fact No. 12. (R. 93) 
Rule 3.10 was certainly adopted in recognition of the 
Board of Pardons1 duty to afford due process to prisoners in 
determining their sentence. Fundamental notions of fair play 
require that the Board of Pardons adhere to those rules and any 
failure to do so was a denial of due process. International House 
v. National Labor Relations Board, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2nd Cir. 
1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1299 (6th Cir. 1980); 
Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 
1970). The trial court also recognized this proposition when it 
stated that "once a parole date has been granted, it cannot be 
taken away by the Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably 
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or upon the whim of the Board members." Conclusions of Law, p. 7. 
(R. 95) 
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Board 
of Pardons complied with these rules. Unfortunately, the record in 
this case demonstrates that such a conclusion was erroneous and 
that the Board of Pardons violated its own rules in a number of 
respects. In its independent analysis of the conclusions of the 
Court of Appeal and the trial court, the court should correct these 
legal errors. 
The language of Rule 3.10 is plain and unambiguous. As 
such, it should be construed according to its clear and literal 
language. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); 
Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 
676 (Utah App. 1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Utah Supreme Court 
recognized much the same principle when is stated that an 
established principle of due process is that a court, or in this 
case a governmental body acting in place of a court, "hears before 
it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after 
trial." Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945). 
The provisions of Rule 3.10 seek to meet this due process 
requirement. 
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The obvious import of Rule 3.10 is that a hearing is to 
be held before the rescinding of a parole date. If it were not so/ 
there would be no need for the rule to state that "the offender 
will be scheduled for a rescission hearing" because the rescission 
would have previously occurred [emphasis added]. 
Northern was not given a hearing prior to the rescission 
of his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 13. (R. 93) In fact, a 
hearing was not held until July 8, 1988 — over two months after 
Northern's parole date had been rescinded. Common sense requires 
that the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner be provided before any deprivation of rights 
occurs. The Board of Pardons cannot hold a hearing some two months 
after the deprivation of a right and then claim that it has 
afforded Northern the due process to which he was entitled when 
having the length of his sentence determined. 
The trial court seems to have held that the failure to 
hold a rescission hearing was proper because extraordinary 
circumstances existed which justified the rescission of Northern's 
parole date without providing prior notice to Northern. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 9. (R. 97) Assuming, arguendo, that such 
extraordinary circumstances existed, these circumstances only 
excused the requirement that Northern be "notified of all 
allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at least seven 
days in advance." A plain reading of the rule reveals that the 
extraordinary circumstances exception has no application to the 
requirement that a rescission hearing be held prior to the 
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rescinding of a parole date. Thus, Northern was entitled to, but 
did not receive, a rescission hearing prior to having his May 10, 
1988 parole date rescinded. 
The procedures of Rule 3.10 further required that the 
Board of Pardons notify Northern of the allegations against him at 
least seven days in advance of the rescission hearing. Northern 
was not informed of any of the allegations against him prior to the 
July 1988 hearing, and at that hearing he was not notified of any 
allegations. Again, the Board designated that hearing as a Special 
Attention Hearing, not a Rescission Hearing. 
Each of these violations of Rule 3.10 by the Board of 
Pardons denied Northern his right to due process. International 
House. 676 F.2d at 912; Bills. 631 F.2d at 1299, Government of 
Canal Zone. 427 F.2d at 347. The record shows that the Board of 
Pardons condemned before it heard and inquired only after passing 
judgment. Christiansen. 163 P.2d at 316. There can be little 
doubt that Northern's parole was indeed taken away at "the whim of 
the Board members" who, only after the fact, sought to justify and 
legitimize their actions. 
The trial court defined "new evidence" as found in Rule 
3.10-1 as any information about Northern not available to the Board 
in July 1981. Consequently, the six year presence of Northern 
within the prison system was new evidence; his omission after the 
initial Board of Pardons hearing to reaffirm or reacknowledge his 
remorse and regret about his crimes was new evidence; and the 
difficulty of the Board of Pardons in creating an intensive parole 
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program for Northern, who was to be paroled to his home state of 
Arizona, was new evidence. This definition is error. The plain 
and literal meaning of the term "new evidence" in Rule 3.10 is 
evidence which was previously concealed from the Board of Pardons 
or specific, affirmative acts that occurred or became known 
subsequent to an inmate's last review or consideration by the Board 
of Pardons. Because all else was known by the Board members or its 
agents, under this definition, the only new evidence the Board of 
Pardons had upon which to base its rescission of Northern's parole 
was a recent Psychological Evaluation — a report which 
specifically stated that it was to be viewed as a favorable report. 
However, the evidence must not only be "new" under Rule 
310, but it must also establish that the "inmate, if released, 
would present a serious risk or danger to the community." There is 
no new evidence, even as the trial court defined "new", that could 
reasonably lead to such a conclusion. The best evidence of 
Northern's likely risk level to the community is the two years he 
spent as a trusty in the Duchesne County Jail, a privileged status 
he still held at the time of the July 8 hearing. 
The recommendations of the Sheriff and the officers who 
supervised him and his lack of a single write-up for conduct within 
the community suggests that Kendall Northern presented a very low 
risk to the community. For risk assessment purposes, Northern had 
essentially been released into the community, and he had performed 
very well. Lt. Stansfield would not have permitted Northern to 
work without supervision on his ninety-year-old mother's farm, 
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where Mrs. Stansfield and Northern would have only each other's 
company for lunch on occasion, if Northern presented even a 
moderate risk of danger, much less a serious risk. 
While anyone who has been convicted of a felony and 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison presents some risk of danger 
to the community,there is nothing about Northern's conduct in the 
community that suggests that he posed a serious risk or danger. 
The Board's contrary conclusion about his risk to society arose 
from the nature of his 1980 crime and cannot be justified as "new 
evidence" under Rule 310. 
The most fundamental principle of due process is 
notice. The only notice ever given Northern concerning the basis 
for rescission of his parole date was that he was a risk to society 
and needed to be appropriately punished for his crime. Due process 
required that Northern be given notice of the reasons for the Board 
of Pardons' decision and the evidence it relied on in reaching that 
decision. Thus, the trial court erred in finding only that there 
was some basis upon which the Board of Pardons could have rescinded 
Northern's parole rather than determining the actual grounds upon 
which the Board of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find the actions 
of the Board of Pardons in May and July 1988 unlawful, eliminate 
the restitution order of 1991, and require that Petitioner be 
terminated from parole in July 1993. 
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ff 
DATED this 2 / day of December, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
JoQefrol Nesset-Sale 
Pro Bono Attorney 
for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH 
STATE PRISON AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 900901925HC 
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for 
trial on July 27, 1990, the plaintiff/petitioner KENDALL Q. 
NORTHERN being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE, the defendants/respondents being 
represented by counsel, C. DANE NOLAN, Assistant Attorney 
General, the Court having heard testimony and accepted 
documentary evidence, the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, the Court having reviewed the entire case file and being 
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fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Northern is presently incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison. On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, he was convicted of 
Criminal Homicide-Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony, and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and 
sentenced to two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State Prison. 
2. On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern attended a hearing before 
the Utah Board of Pardons. After the hearing the Board of 
Pardons determined that Mr. Northern should be paroled from the 
Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988. 
3. During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr. 
Northern had had a serious drug problem and that he had abused 
drugs heavily during the first two years of his incarceration. 
This information was new information in that it was not available 
to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
4. On September 24, 1984 the Board of Pardons considered 
Mr. Northern's incarceration status, including a caseworker's 
recommendation to shorten his term of incarceration, and 
determined that he should not be released on parole prior to the 
scheduled parole date of May 10, 1988. 
5. In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the 
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Duchesne County Jail. He gained trustee status quickly and 
during the next two years worked outside of the jail. Frequently 
this was unsupervised work including substantial periods of time 
when he labored on the farm of the elderly mother of Mr. Ralph 
Stansfield. At another location he helped construct a fire 
station. During these periods he never attempted to escape. 
6. Also, on February 25, 1988 Mr. Northern was discovered 
using marijuana by jail authorities. This fact was reported to 
the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of 
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. This information was new 
information in that it was not available to the Board of Pardons 
on July 8, 1981. 
7. On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested 
that the Utah State Prison perform a Psychological Assessment 
upon Mr. Northern and supply that information to the Board of 
Pardons. 
8. On May 5, 1988 the Board of Pardons received a 
Psychological Evaluation performed by Dr. Al Carlisle, Chief 
Clinical Psychologist at the Utah State prison, and his assistant 
Dr. E. Ted Branthurst. The evaluation indicated that at age 16 
Mr. Northern had left home to wander the western states and 
became deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. It 
noted that Mr. Northern admitted that he was high on LSD at the 
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time he committed his crime and that he had used LSD, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and marijuana. The report also stated that Mr. 
Northern viewed his drug dependency as a major factor in his 
anti-social behavior. The report indicated that Northern's major 
problem was his inability to deal with life's stresses without 
the use of illegal substances. 
9. In Northern's favor the psychologists noted that while 
at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne County Jail, Northern 
maintained an excellent volunteer and work record, had an I.Q. in 
the superior range, and had completed his Associate of Arts in 
Business and three technical training courses offered by the Utah 
State Prison. The evaluation also noted that Northern had shown 
growth and maturing since his evaluation in 1984 and did not 
appear to have the capacity for violent acting out. The 
psychologists closed the report with a statement that "for 
purposes of the Board of Pardons determinations, this report is 
to be regarded as a favorable one." 
10. This information contained in the May 5, 1988 
Psychological Evaluation was new information in that it was not 
available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
11. During his 1984 written request for redetermination to 
the Board of Pardons Mr. Northern did not express any remorse 
about the crimes he had committed or the victims of his crimes. 
4 
12. In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies 
in effect which governed its actions and proceedings. In May 
1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as 
follows: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the 
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written 
referral indicating that the offender is in violation 
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison, 
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local, 
state or federal government, or new evidence is 
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a 
serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing 
date, information shall be provided to the Board 
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. 
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be 
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be 
notified of all allegations and the date of the 
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance. 
13. On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr. 
Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date. Prior to that 
rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating 
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's 
action on May 9, 1988. In the document detailing the rescission 
the Board made the following remark: "Continue for another 
psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report". 
14. The second psychological report was prepared on May 11, 
5 
t 
1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern, Gail Caldwell. 
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with 
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that 
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father, 
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them 
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled. 
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he 
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to 
help him adjust to life outside of prison. 
15. On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a 
hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status. Mr. 
Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988. 
16. On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the 
hearing. At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address 
the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to 
respond to questioning from the Board. 
17. At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons 
affirmed the rescission of Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole 
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for 
"appropriate punishment"# and rescheduled a rehearing for May, 
1990. 
18. On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the 
Duchesne County Jail. On October 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons, 
6 
because of Mr. Northern's escape, rescinded Mr. Northern's May 
1990 scheduled rehearing. 
19. Subsequently Mr. Northern was captured and returned to 
the Utah State Prison. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate 
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider 
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its 
jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate. 
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board 
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside 
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a 
constitutional right of the offender. 
It is well established that an offender has no right to be 
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons. However, once a 
parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the 
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim 
of the Board members. 
The question presented by this case is whether there is a 
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to 
rescind Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date. Board Rule 3.10 
(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this 
7 
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question. It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an 
offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral 
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution 
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if 
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the 
community. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written 
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had 
violated institutional rules. Thus, that portion of Rule 3.10 is 
inapplicable. Additionally, the grant of parole had not been 
rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of 
institutional rules. 
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court 
defines "new evidence" as negative information received by the 
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is 
set and the time that a rescission determination is made. In 
this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This 
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the 
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime. 
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case 
and keeping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is 
8 
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t evidence" received by the Board Pardons 
which justified Board's decision to rescu il Hi 
May 1988 parole date. There was evidence regarding Mr. 
* State Prison and drug use at 
Duchesne County Jail. Such drug use was illegal 3 
evidence which showed that Mr. Northern failed to show any 
remnjLht1 I 111 I 11 111 il 1 in 1 dim 1 I IIin 1 1 imc In 111111 committed 
and that his behavior was f some extent, anti-social This new 
evidence indicated that, if released, Mr. Northern would present 
a serious risk or danger t.o I In?
 c o m m i m 
Als circumstances relating to Mr. Northern on r *), 
1 aordinary circumstances under Rule ^.^v 
which justified the rescission of the parole date without 
providing prior notice to Mr. Northern. 
JkJi 11 I, 1 o n 1 i I |" 1 1 1 in" 1 -1 "i - i" 111 I Ihiii' -I1 "ii I, 1 1 (,! record l.pads the Court 
to conclude that the Board Pardons did not rescind Mr. 
Northern > release date because believed deserved to 
be incarcerated • <»" ,o- 1 1 1 "re 
of his crime. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
For the reasons set forth above, the Board of Pardons did 
r (,'otifJ i tut. ional rights. The petition 
> - vi'-t 1 
for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore', denied with prejudice. 
DATED THIS j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, /990 
FUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
rDISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
*."*r"3/ APPROVED AS TO FORM: A T T E S T 
J07CAR0L NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
10 
ADDENDUM B 
Ch^ This opinion is subject to revision before . 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. tyJlALt5fcn:j^" ^ 
-ooOoo- - " 
Kenda 11^ Q.- Northern, 
P1 a in11 f f and Appe ] 1 c 11 i t:, 
v. 
N. Eldon Barnes, Warden, 
Utah State Prison and the 
Department of Corrections 
through the Board of 
Pardons, 
Defendants .i\uI i|>pe I 1 ees 
*srj Wary T. Nconaft 
v
 Clerk ot the Coari 
'Utah Court of Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900566-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 2 4 • 1 3 92) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneysi :;arol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and Kirk M. 
gensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Garff. 
LIKNni, lll"i es nil i inn) .I UN!()*,»: 
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petitioned the trial 
court for a writ of habeas corpus following a decision of the 
Board of Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original parole date, 
Northern appealed the trial court's decision, but was 
subsequently paroled during the pendency of this appeal. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old drifter, pleaded 
guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery for his 
participation in the shooting death of a cab driver earlier that 
same year. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences 
at the Utah State Prison. He later admitted he was under the 
influence of LSD at the time of the shooting, and had been deeply 
involved in drugs. 
After Northern had been imprisoned for a year, the Board met 
and granted him a May 10, 1988 parole date- The Board 
reconsidered Northern's status in 1984, and determined that the 
1988 parole date would remain intact despite evidence that 
Northern had used drugs at the prison during his incarceration. 
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the Duchesne County 
Jail where he attained trustee status. Over the next two years, 
Northern was allowed to work unsupervised outside the jail- In 
early 1988, with only a few months remaining before his projected 
parole, jail authorities discovered that Northern was again using 
drugs. This information was reported to the prison and received 
by the Board before his parole date. 
Two months before his parole date, a psychological 
assessment of Northern was made at the request of the Board- The 
report indicated that Northern had been a heavy drug user, and 
had been unable to deal with life's stresses without drugs. The 
report also said Northern acknowledged that his drug dependence 
was a major factor contributing to his antisocial behavior. 
Before the report was published, the Board also attempted to 
obtain Northern's consent to additional terms of release that 
would have included drug testing. On the advice of his father, 
however, Northern refused to consent to the new conditions. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded Northern's May 10 parole 
date, pending further review, and ordered another psychological 
evaluation. The need for another psychological evaluation and 
complete prison progress report was listed in the written notice 
by the Board as the ground for rescinding Northern'^ original 
parole date. The supplemental assessment focused on potential 
problems affecting Northern's adjustment into society posed by 
his relationship with his father. A full rescission hearing was 
then scheduled for July 8, 1988.l 
At that hearing, the Board determined that Northern 
continued to be a risk to society, and refused to grant him 
parole at that time. The Board scheduled a rehearing for May 
1990, and Northern was returned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two 
months later, however, he escaped and fled to Canada. The Board 
then rescinded the rehearing scheduled for May 1990. Northern 
was captured and returned to prison on October 6, 1989. 
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as policy, that 
M[a]n offender shall be notified at least seven calendar days in 
advance of a hearing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and 
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of the hearing." 
See Utah Admin. R. 655-202 (1991). 
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Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief and habeas 
corpus under Rule 65B(b)(2) and (4), and (f) of the Utah Rules 
Civil Procedure.2 The petition prayed for (1) declaratory relief 
as to the unlawfulness of Northern's confinement since May 10, 
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate release, and (3) damages in 
excess of $1 0,000 for "breach of contract" on the ground that a 
parole date created a legally binding agreement on the State. 
After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and 
Northern filed a noti ce of appeal. The Board subsequently set a 
July 1991 parole date, and required restitution of $26,350 by 
Northern as a condition of parole. Northern agreed to the new 
conditions, and was paroled on Ju] y 9, 2 99] , whi 3 e this appeal 
was pending. 
ANALYSIS 
In general, the purpose of extraordinary relief under Rule 
65B is to test the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the propriety 
of any related proceedings, by forcing a judicial hearing. See 
Ziealer v. Miliken. 583 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). Northern 
presents no authority, however, for extending the purposes of 
extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring contract claims. We 
also conclude that the demand for Northern's immediate parole is 
moot because parole was granted subsequent to the filing of this 
appeal. Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).3 We 
are therefore left only with Northern's prayer for declaratory 
relief as to the in il awfulness of h i s "confinement." 
Inasmuch as Northern is r to longer incarcerated, we must 
consider whether his request for declaratory relief is also moot. 
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus petitions that would have been 
otherwise rendered moot by the release of a prisoner when the 
prisoner suffers "collateral legal consequences" from a 
conviction, such as "the use of the conviction to impeach the 
petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence 
2. Rule 65B was complete]y reorganized after Northern's petition 
was filed. See Utah R. Ci v. P 65B (amended effective September 
1 1 Q Q 1) and advisory committee note. 
Although moot questions are generally not considered on 
appeal due to the judicial policy against advisory opinions, 
courts have reached the merits of an issue that is technically 
moot, but is "of wide concern, affects the public interest, is 
likely to recur in a similar manner, and, because of the brief 
time any one person is affected, would otherwise likely escape 
judicial review . . . ." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 
(Utah 1981). 
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in a future trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote, 
engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." Duran v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981). 
Northern argues that he would have completed his parole in 
May 1991, if the Board had not violated his due process rights in 
rescinding his original parole date. Thus, the request for 
declaratory relief becomes a question of whether Northern's 
extended parole status was a collateral legal consequence of 
alleged due process violations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377 (1963), the United States Supreme 
Court held that release on parole does not render a petition for 
habeas corpus moot because parole "imposes conditions which 
significantly confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom." Since 
parole imposes conditions of confinement and Northern's parole 
status past May 1991 is a consequence of rescinding his original 
parole date, we proceed to address his claim for credit against 
his parole period for time served while incarcerated after his 
original parole date. 
In prior cases, discretion to give credit for time served 
was determined to lie solely with the Board. In State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the reason given for 
rejecting a similar argument demanding credit for time served was 
the Board's discretion to determine the period of time to be 
served. Likewise, in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09 
(Utah App. 1988), we held that Utah courts have no authority to 
grant credit for time served prior to conviction since the power 
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested exclusively with the 
Board under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990). 
Northern suggests that the Board's exercise of this 
discretionary authority is now subject to* judicial review under 
the recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991). We disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an 
extraordinary writ, contending "that the.manner in which his 
parole hearings have been conducted [had] deprived him of 
procedural due process." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that, 
under the Utah Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due process 
in proceedings before the Board. Ijd. at 735. The supreme court 
then referred the case to a trial court to ascertain factually 
"the procedures followed by the board" and to decide what is 
procedurally required in. "the conduct of the parole hearings." 
Id. Since Northern was afforded full procedural due process by 
the July 8, 1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural 
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole date were remedied 
before this petition was filed. Northern's claim relates, 
therefore, not to the procedural due process issues outlined in 




rved beyond his original 
Termination of Northeri i s sentence is triggered by 
"completion of three years on parole outside of confinement and 
without violation . • unless the person is earlier terminated 
by the Board of Pardons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(1) (1990). 
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing 
concerning revocation of parole constitutes service of sentence" 
rather than time on parole. Section 76-3-202(3)(c). Since the 
Board has discretion to parole or discharge an inmate at any 
time, see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given Northern a 
parole period of less than three years and thereby credited him 
for the time served while incarcerated beyond his original parole 
date. We deem the Board's decision to not give Northern an 
earlier release date an exercise of its discretion. 
The Board's ri ght to rely on any factors known in May 1988, 
or later adduced at the July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be 
afforded such factors in deciding whether Northern posed a 
societal risk, as we J 1 as whether an order of restitution was 
appropriate, are all matters within the discretion o'f the Board. 
They are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to 
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3) Accordingly, we hold 
that habeas corpus is not available in this case as a post 
release remedy to modify the release date ordered by the Boa r cl 
We have reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal and 
deem them to be without merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 888 (Utah 1989) It is within our discretion to "analyze and 




The trial court's denial of the writ is affirmed, 
jZUtc^l tOrOef^J^ 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
naTW. Garff, Judg W 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
&46LM- Site***) 
•"Judith M. B i l l i n g s , Judg4r 
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Kendall Q. NORTHERN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
N. Eldon BARNES, Warden, Utah State 
Prison and the Department of Correc-
tions through the Board of Pardons, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 900566-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 24, 1992. 
Inmate petitioned for habeas corpus 
after his original parole date was rescind-
ed. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied the 
petition, and inmate appealed. While ap-
peal was pending, inmate was paroled. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, PJ., held 
that (1) inmate's request for declaratory 
relief was not moot following his release on 
parole, and (2) decision of Board of Pardons 
to not give inmate earlier release was an 
exercise of its discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Billings, J., concurred in the result 
See also 814 P.2d 1148. 
1. Courts <*=»207.1 
In general, purpose of extraordinary 
relief under extraordinary writs rule is to 
test lawfulness of imprisonment, and pro-
priety of any related proceedings, by forc-
ing judicial hearing. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
65B. 
2. Courts «=>207.1 
Extraordinary writs rule does not pro-
vide procedure to bring contract claims. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65B. 
3. Habeas Corpus <*=>826(2) 
Inmate's demand for immediate parole 
was moot where parole was granted subse-
quent to filing of appeal from denial of 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 65B. 
4. Declaratory Judgment $=>84 
A parolee's request for declaratory re-
lief as to unlawfulness of his confinement 
was not rendered moot by fact that parole 
was granted subsequent to filing of appeal; 
parolee was alleging that if Board of Par-
dons had not violated his due process 
rights in rescinding his original parole date 
he would have completed his parole, and 
parolee was claiming credit against his pa-
role period for time served while incarcer-
ated after his original parole date. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
5. Criminal Law «=>1216.1(2) 
Discretion to give credit for time 
served lies solely with the Board of Par-
dons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). 
6. Prisons «=»15(1) 
Power to reduce or terminate sen-
tences is vested exclusively within Board of 
Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). 
7. Pardon and Parole $=»59 
Any of alleged procedural deficiencies 
in rescinding inmate's original parole date 
were remedied by full rescission hearing 
held before Board of Pardons. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
8. Habeas Corpus e»516 
Habeas corpus was not available as 
postrelease remedy to modify release date 
ordered by the Board of Pardons, even 
though parolee's original scheduled parole 
date was rescinded by Board of Pardons 
one day before parole date; Board had 
right to rely on any factors known at the 
time, including parolee's drug history, or 
later adduced at hearing ordered and had 
discretion to determine weight to be given 
to the factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1), 
(3Kc), (5), 77-27-5(3). 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and 
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellees. 
Before BENCH, PJ., and BILLINGS and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully peti-
tioned the trial court for a writ of habeas 
corpus following a decision of the Board of 
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original 
parole date. Northern appealed the trial 
court's decision, but was subsequently pa-
roled during the pendency of this appeal. 
We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old 
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder and aggravated robbery for his 
participation in the shooting death of a cab 
driver earlier that same year. Northern 
was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences 
at the Utah State Prison. He later admit-
ted he was under the influence of LSD at 
the time of the shooting, and had been 
deeply involved in drugs. 
After Northern had been imprisoned for 
a year, the Board met and granted him a 
May 10, 1988 parole date. The Board re-
considered Northern's status in 1984, and 
determined that the 1988 parole date would 
remain intact despite evidence that North-
ern had used drugs at the prison during his 
incarceration. 
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the 
Duchesne County Jail where he attained 
trustee status. Over the next two years, 
Northern was allowed to work unsuper-
vised outside the jail. In early 1988, with 
only a few months remaining before his 
projected parole, jail authorities discovered 
that Northern was again using drugs. 
This information was reported to the prison 
and received by the Board before his parole 
date. 
Two months before his parole date, a 
psychological assessment of Northern was 
made at the request of the Board. The 
report indicated that Northern had been a 
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as 
policy, that "[a]n offender shall be notified at 
least seven calendar days in advance of a hear-
ing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and 
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of 
the hearing." See Utah Admin.R. 655-202 
(1991). 
NORTHERN v. BARNES Utah 697 
CiteM823 PJd 696 (UtahApp. 1992) 
heavy drug user, and had been unable to 
deal with life's stresses without drugs. 
The report also said Northern acknowl-
edged that his drug dependence was a ma-
jor factor contributing to his antisocial be-
havior. Before the report was published, 
the Board also attempted to obtain North-
em's consent to additional terms of release 
that would have included drug testing. On 
the advice of his father, however, Northern 
refused to consent to the new conditions. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded 
Northern's May 10 parole date, pending 
further review, and ordered another psy-
chological evaluation. The need for anoth-
er psychological evaluation and complete 
prison progress report was listed in the 
written notice by the Board as the ground 
for rescinding Northern's original parole 
date. The supplemental assessment fo-
cused on potential problems affecting 
Northern's adjustment into society posed 
by his relationship with his father. A full 
rescission hearing was then scheduled for 
July 8, 1988.1 
At that hearing, the Board determined 
that Northern continued to be a risk to 
society, and refused to grant him parole at 
that time. The Board scheduled a rehear-
ing for May 1990, and Northern was re-
turned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two 
months later, however, he escaped and fled 
to Canada. The Board then rescinded the 
rehearing scheduled for May 1990. North-
ern was captured and returned to prison on 
October 6, 1989. 
Northern.petitioned for extraordinary re-
lief and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(bX2) 
and (4), and (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.2 The petition prayed for (1) 
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of 
Northern's confinement since May 10, 
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate re-
lease, and (3) damages in excess of $10,000 
for "breach of contract" on the ground that 
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after 
Northern's petition was filed. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
65B (amended effective September 1, 1991) and 
advisory committee note. 
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a parole date created a legally binding 
agreement on the State. After a hearing, 
the trial court denied the petition, and 
Northern filed a notice of appeal. The 
Board subsequently set a July 1991 parole 
date, and required restitution of $26,350 by 
Northern as a condition of parole. North-
ern agreed to the new conditions, and was 
paroled on July 9, 1991, while this appeal 
was pending. 
ANALYSIS 
[1-3] In general, the purpose of ex-
traordinary relief under Rule 65B is to test 
the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the 
propriety of any related proceedings, by 
forcing a judicial hearing. See Ziegler v. 
Miliken, 583 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). 
Northern presents no authority, however, 
for extending the purposes of extraordi-
nary writs as a procedure to bring contract 
claims. We also conclude that the demand 
for Northern's immediate parole is moot 
because parole was granted subsequent to 
the filing of this appeal. Spain v. Stewart, 
639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).* We are 
therefore left only with Northern's prayer 
for declaratory relief as to the unlawful-
ness of his "confinement" 
[4] Inasmuch as Northern is no longer 
incarcerated, we must consider whether his 
request for declaratory relief is also moot 
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus peti-
tions that would have been otherwise ren-
dered moot by the release of a prisoner 
when the prisoner suffers "collateral legal 
consequences" from a conviction, such as 
"the use of the conviction to impeach the 
petitioner's character or as a factor in de-
termining a sentence in a future trial, as 
well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage 
in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." 
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1981). 
Northern argues that he would have 
completed his parole in May 1991, if the 
Board had not violated his due process 
3. Although moot questions are generally not 
considered on appeal due to the judicial policy 
against advisory opinions, courts have reached 
the merits of an issue that is technically moot, 
but is "of wide concern, affects the public inter-
right* in rescinding his original parole date. 
Thus, the request for declaratory relief be-
come* * question of whether Northern's 
extended parole status was a collateral le-
gal consequence of alleged due process vio-
lations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct 373, 377, 9 L.EA2d 
285 (1963), the United States Supreme 
Court held that release on parole does not 
render a petition for habeas corpus moot 
because parole "imposes conditions which 
significantly confine and restrain [a parol-
ee's] freedom." Since parole imposes con-
ditions of confinement and Northern's pa-
role status past May 1991 is a consequence 
of rescinding his original parole date, we 
proceed to address his claim for credit 
against his parole period for time served 
while incarcerated after his original parole 
date. 
[5,6] In prior cases, discretion to give 
credit for time served was determined to lie 
sotety wfth the Board. Iii State v. Scfireu-
der, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the 
reason given for rejecting a similar argu-
ment demanding credit for time served was 
the Board's discretion to determine the pe-
riod of time to be served. Likewise, in 
State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09 
(Utah App.1988), we held that Utah courts 
have no authority to grant credit for time 
served prior to conviction since the power 
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested 
exclusively with the Board under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990). 
[7] Northern suggests that the Board's 
exercise of this discretionary authority is 
now subject to judicial review under the 
recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). We 
disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an 
extraordinary writ, contending "that the 
rmtKver in which his parole hearing* have 
been conducted [had] deprived him of pro-
cedural due process." Id. The Utah Su-
preme Court held that, under the Utah 
Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due 
est, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and, 
because of the brief time any one person is 
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial 
review...." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1981). 
STATE v. CASTNER 
CIUM825 ?2d 699 (UtahApp. 1992) 
process in proceedings before the Board, without merit 
Id. at 735. The supreme court then re-
ferred the case to a trial court to ascertain 
factually "the procedures followed by the 
board" and to decide what is procedurally 
required in "the conduct of the parole hear-
ings." Id. Since Northern was afforded 
full procedural due process by the July 8, 
1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural 
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole 
date were remedied before this petition 
was filed. Northern's claim relates, there-
fore, not to the procedural due process 
issues outlined in Foote, but to the reason-
ableness of the Board's decision in not 
granting Northern credit for the time 
served beyond his original parole date. 
[8] Termination of Northern's sentence 
is triggered by "completion of three years 
on parole outside of confinement and with-
out violation . . . unless the person is earli-
er terminated by the Board of Pardons." 
Utah Code Ann. § 7^-3-202(1) (1990). 
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a 
hearing . . . concerning revocation of parole 
constitutes service of sentence" rather 
than time on parole. Section 76-3-
202(3Xc). Since the Board has discretion to 
parole or discharge an inmate at any time, 
see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given 
Northern a parole period of less than three 
years and thereby credited him for the time 
served while incarcerated beyond his origi-
nal parole date. We deem the Board's 
decision to not give Northern an earlier 
release date an exercise of its discretion. 
The Board's right to rely on any factors 
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the 
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be 
afforded such factors in deciding whether 
Northern posed a societal risk, as well as 
whether an order of restitution was appro-
priate, are all matters within the discretion 
of the Board. They are precisely the kinds 
of issues that are not subject to judicial 
review under section 77-27-5(3). Accord-
ingly, we hold that habeas corpus is not 
available in this case as a post release 
remedy to modify the release date ordered 
by the Board. 
We have reviewed the remaining issues 
raised on appeal and deem them to be 
Utah 699 
See State v. Carter, 776 
P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (it is within our 
discretion to "analyze and address in writ-
ing each and every argument, issue, or 
claim raised"). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the writ is 
affirmed. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result 
O | HY NUMM« SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
William Eluie CASTNER, II and Bonnie 
Lee Castner, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 910275-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 24, 1992. 
Driver and passenger were convicted 
in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne 
County, Dennis L. Draney, J., of drug-relat-
ed offenses. Driver and passenger appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that (1) request to search for second ve-
hicle identification number on door post 
was not reasonably related to issuance of 
speeding ticket; (2) driver voluntarily con-
sented to search of vehicle; (3) taint from 
illegal search for door post number had 
dissipated; and (4) consent to search ve-
hicle extended to contents of containers 
found in vehicle and trunk. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred in result only. 
ADDENDUM C 
™'g i ^r^r'[\ *-w n~ 
July 7. 1988 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I have known Ken Northern for the past £: 1/*E 
years while he has been a inrnate here at the 
Duchesne County Jail- One of the biggest changes 
that I have seen Ken make is his attitude, his 
attitude about li^e, oeoole, and t^e reasons why 
things happen the way they do. He seems to have 
a lot better unde^st and 1 rip about things anc a lot 
more patience. 
Ker« has snown us while he has been he~e ail 
the many talents that he possess- He has kestec 
himself busy while here with many Different wov> 
projects. Ken has been a good trustee here at the 
jail anz nas heloed our aeoa^tment Dy cleaning, 
builcmg. aric giving us helpful ideas. 
During the oast few months Ken has he 1 ceo me 
along with Sgt. Jerry Foote get our Photo L5D anc 
Crime Lab out together. He has taught Sgt. rcote 
and myself how to aevelope pictures. I am Sgt. 
^oote have appreciated his help i>" the Lap. 
During the time while ou^ jaii hac work 
release Ken heloec me arid my widowed rootner on our 
farm. Ken was a great help to me a~c my mother. 
Ken die all th.is on his own witnoLt muc-i 
compensation. Also while on work release Ken also 
heloec tne Duchesne County Fair Board builc a new 
arena^ stalls, bleachers, and grandstand. 
<Bn along witr> a few of the other mrates 
he1pec a local boy with his Eagle Scout Project, 
they helped him put a flag pole in tne grouno out 
in front of the Sheriff's Office. Ken and the boy 
themselves d^iCKec around the flag pole, so a 
memorial placue could be place on it. This flag-
pole is a memorial flag pol& for- Lt. G&^rv L. I vie 
who was killed in the line of duty. 
I feel that Ken if paroled will nave tne 
support from his family who live in Arizona anc I 
feel that he has the potential to be cooc citizen. 
Respectfully, 
Lt. Raich Stansfielc 
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ADDENDUM E 
DUGHESVE COUffTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT 
Sheriff Clair M. Poulson 
Chief Deputy Doug Horrocks 
[Drawer M 








March £ £ , 1988 
Ms. Vicki Palacios, Chairman 
Board of Pardons 
6065 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Dear Ms. Palacios, 
This letter is being written iri regards to 
Inmate Kendall Ouinn Northern, #15o03. Inmate 
Northern has been in Duchesne County Jail on the 
prison outcount program for the past 2 years. He 
sas made • t i s l *ess ve^y few 
problems while here. 
He has been a trusty much of the time and has 
preformed a number of different jobs such as 
kitchen helper. He has done several remodeling jobs 
in the jail, assisted us in our photo lab and other 
things. 
We have noted that Ken has good family 
support, his folks having traveled from Arizona to 
see him on a number of occasions. We have talked 
with them on the phone on other occasions. It 
appears to us that he would so well being back with 
his family in Arizona. We believe that his work 
opportunities and living arrangements in Arizona 
are very good. His chances for success if he were 
allowed to parole in Arizona would be much better 
than if he were required to stay in Utah., 
Thank you for your consideration in this 
matter* 
Respectfully Yours 
Sgt. Veldcm Lefler 
Jail C/snunander 
ClairV M. Poulson 
Sheriff Duchesne County 
ADDENDUM F 
INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM , " 
APPROVAL/DENIAL CHECK LIST
 : 3 
CLIENT NAME: NORTHERN, KENDALL USP..NO.: 15009 
RELEASE DATE: MAY 10, 1988 XXX HIGH RISK 
STAFFING DATE: JANUARY 21, 1988 ELEC. MONITORING 
APPROVED: The above client has been found to meet all 
XXX objective criteria listed on both the memo from the 
Board of Pardons and those developed by the ISP Team, 
DENIAL: The above client does NOT meet all objective 
criteria. The following comments will explain why the 
ISP staff made the decision of rejection. 
COMMENTS: 
According to BCI and the current case file, the 
subject is incarcerated for Murder, Agg. Assault, 
and Forgery (9 counts). Although Mr. Northern has 
no prior adult arrests, he has seven juvenile 
referrals or arrests. It should be noted that the 
subject shot and killed a cab driver for $26.00 in 
cash. The Region III ISP Staff recommends ISP High 
Risk as a condition of Mr. Northern's Parole. Risk 
score 31. 
The above client has been seen by a member of the ISP Team, 
the program has been explained,he/she agreed to participate, 
and he/she has signed the attached ISP Agreement. 
The above client has not been seen by a member of the ISP 
Team, but has had the ISP Program explained on 
and agreed to participate. 
ADDENDUM G 
Board of Pardons 
6100 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Re: Kendall Quinn Northern #15009 
Dear Members; 
I would like to open by thanking you for this oppertunity to have a 
say in my future. The future is very important to me. The outcome of 
this hearing will have a lasting effect on both my families life and mine. 
I was a seventeen year old kid when I entered this institution. I 
will be a twenty six year old man when I leave. I am no longer a child. 
I have matured and learned from this experiance. I know that prison is 
not where I want to be. I know that I have the ability to succeed. My 
families support for me is tremendous. And with it I can not fail. 
In 1981 I went before the Board of Pardons. My family and I spoke to 
them and told them at that time, I wanted to go home to Arizona when released. 
My family and I have been planing for my life upon return to Arizona since 
that hearing. We have planed for every forseeable problem, every detail of 
my return. Until a month ago. 
A month ago a problem that was not forseen was thrown into my life. I 
received a waiver stating that my parole aggeemenbtwas being changed to 
include ISP. That is why I have requested this hearing. To ask why. And 
to explain my plans for the future. To explain how much of a detriment to 
myself and the state of Utah, Placing me on ISP in Utah would be. 
On may tenth I am going to be reieased. I will leave here with the 
cloth's on my back and one hundred dollars. If I must stay in Utah and 
complete ISP, I must find a place to live where ISP is avialible. I have 
a Sister and a Brother in Blanding Utah as well as Aunts and Uncles, Cousins 
and a Grandmother there. I also have a job there. But ISP is not avialible 
there. Therefore I will have to find a place to live along the Wasatch 
Front, in Richfield or in St. George. I do not have any family or relatives 
in any of these areas. So I must find a place to live on my own. A place 
that will fit my budget of one hundred dollars, to eat, live and clothe 
myself on. In my opinion an enviorment such as that would not be condusive 
to the successfull completion of ISP. I also have to find a job. Yet if 
I spend money on clothing appropriate for job hunting. I will be spending 
money I need to live on and pay rent with. On the otherhand, in Arizona, 
my family can give me a place to live, food, and the support I need to be 
successfull. I also have a good job waiting for me there so I can go 
right to work. 
During my incarceration I have been informed by prison officials on a 
number of occasions that there are contracts on my life. I testified 
agianst my partner and because of that my life has been threatend on a number 
of occasions. This is why I have been housed in the Duchesne County Jail 
for the past two years. For my own protection. Yet the type of enviorment 
I will have to stay in if I am required to stay in Utah. Would make it 
very easy to find me and carry out these contracts. As you can see my staying 
in Utah is not to your advantage or mine. 
„. Northern v Barnes et. al 
900901905 HC 
As you know from the letters you have received from my family. My best 
chance for successfully compleating parole and becoming a productive member 
of society is in Arizona with them. I have a good job in construction 
waiting for me there. I have a place to live, food to eat and a family 
that is as determined for me to succeed as I myself am. Most of all Pheonix 
is my home. I grew up there and want to go back. I know I can succeed 
there. My family and I have been planing for my return to Pheonix for the 
past eight years. 
My father has been in touch with the Arizona parole department and they 
have told him that they will accept me. But only under Arizona*s parole 
system. They said they would not accept any parole stipulations from Utah. 
Theywill look at my record, crime, job, housing and prison record. From 
these they will plac^me on the level of parole they think is necessary. 
Arizona told my father that Utah is aware of this, yet the last parole 
agreement given to me to sign seemed to indicate Utah is unwilling to allow 
Arizona to set its own conditions for my parole. 
Arizona is where I want to go and is where I belong. My best chance for 
success is there with my family. I have the abilities and resources to 
succeed on parole if you will help me. Please understand that I will live 
by, and I will succeed at, any type of parole I am placed on. In Utah or 
in Arizona. I am only asking that you help me to succeed. All I want is 
a fighting chance. 
As I have explained my best chance for success is with my family in 
Arizona. Please give me that chance. 
Thank You, 
Kendall Quinn Northern #15009 
ADDENDUM H 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
onsideration of the Status of Kendall Northern Utah State Prison No. L J ^ L 
he above-entitled matter came before a Hearing Officer on the La— day of April , 19 £8 
)r consideration as: 
. D ORIGINAL HEARING 3. • RECISSION HEARING 
. D PAROLE VIOLATION 4. S OTHER —Special At tent ion 
fter hearing the statement of K' g.»J» II ^ ^ ^ u v i and the following witness(es) 
| 2) , the following decision was rendered: 
] Parole to become effective , 19 _, with the following special conditions: 
B. U**i4k Tl**~Pf (£) KA«.<~4*;~ V„if T, -.. 4^p h*u*A-l £ • ru {/ ~ T,»«* 7 / u\lt « t JA /„, 
] Rehearing for # / , 19 , for the following reasons: 
A. JCQ. A * . • \*i~ wny , t f > ^ r C i ^ „ I C^^^r- £ * ^ UL£ £*± *—»jL+ _ 
B. 
] Termination of Sentence to become effective , 19 
1 Expiration of Sentence , 19 
OTE: This Interim Decision is binding and in full force and effect Until reviewed by the Board of Pardons 
lembers, who will make the final determination in this matter. 
i the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah State 
rison, of any Community Correction Center or of any residential facility or is found in violation of any law of the 
tate of Utah this order may be made null and void. .-^ 
April 19i 1988 C V o 4 
>ate Hearing Officers 
Northern v Barnes et. al. 
900901905 HC 




* $ & * 
MME: Kendall Quinn Northern \j~ts 
)ATE: 5 May 1988 ^ ^ifcO 
JSP#: 15009 V ^ c P ^ 
CF 
REASON FOR EVALUATION: Request of the Utah State Board of Pardons to aid in determining 
suitability of inmate for release on parole. 
ASSESSMENT MODALITIES USED: Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Driggs 
Developmental Inventory, BiPolar Psychological Inven-
tory Report, Psychological Interview. 
lACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Northern is the youngest of four children born to Donald 
nd Claire Northern. He is a well-nourished, healthy-looking white male 26 years of 
ge. He reports his childhood was fairly uneventful except that he was always heavy 
nd big for his age. His size appears to have caused him difficulty psychologically 
ince he felt he never could fit in with others and attributes his initiation into the 
rug culture to the fact that "they would accept anybody, just as long as they took 
Irugs." Mr. Northern's home life was reported as stable with major moves to Arizona 
nd California as a youth. At 16 Mr. Northern left home to wander the western states 
nd became more deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. He stated that he 
as high on LSD at the time he commited his crime. Among drugs that Mr. Northern 
dmitted to using were LSD, cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other 
rugs such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory. He said he had no 
Icohol abuse problem. He is single with no children. 
s a prison Inmate Mr. Northern has had disciplinary write ups for his drug usage, 
ut that behavior has been absent from his jacket for at least the past four years, 
e is presently incarcerated at the Duchesne County Jail where he is reported to be 
model inmate according to staff. He was transferred to the Duchesne facility two 
ears ago as a protective measure. While at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne, Mr. 
orthern maintained an excellent volunteer and work record. 
NTERVIEW BEHAVIOR: Mr. Northern was very verbal and cooperative during the assess-
ent interview. It was obvious that he was anxious about the situation, but soon 
aimed down after venting his frustrations about the status of his upcoming parole, 
e was quite open about his past history and reflective about the consequences of 
is past crime. He was very insistant about having drug therapy in addition to any 
ental health therapy ordered by the Board, viewing his drug dependancy as a major 
actor in his anti-social behavior, 
YTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: No I.Q. tests were administered to Mr. Northern at this 
ime. However, he presents himself as an articulate, intelligent, and well-read 
idividual. This impression is consistent with earlier testing which placed his 
/erall IQ at 129 (superior range). While at the prison Mr. Northern completed his 
>sociate of Arts in Business degree and three technical training courses offered 
/ the prison. 
PAGE 1 of 2 
Northern v Barnes et. al. 
900901905 HC , 
Defendant's Exhibit # /^ 
>ERSONALITY INTEGRATION: Testing showed that Mr. Northern was honest in answering 
,est questions and tended to be overly truthful. He definitely feels proud about 
is abilities and has high self-esteem, security, self-satisfaction, and a positive 
elf-image. He displays an open attitude in listening to and accepting help, and 
as a willingness to discuss himself and his problems and cooperate with professional 
ealth-care deliverers. He is mildly independent, non-conforming and may have 
ifficulty in expressing anger or hostility in a modulated fashion. He is energetic 
nd active with rebellious traits in his attitudes and behaviors. 
ECOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: Overall, Mr. Northern has shown a great deal of 
rowth and maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this maturing may 
e due to age, but an important aspect of his growth can be attributed to the social 
nteractions and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at the Duchesne 
ounty Jail. He has been given more responsibility and respect than at any other 
ime of his life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a responsible adult. 
r. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this time. His major problem 
s his capacity to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal substances. 
* fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address drug issues as part of his 
irole agreement. 
I though Mr. Northern can be physically and verbally imposing, he does 
lve the capacity for violent acting out. He can be argumentative and 
it responds to authority when necessary. 
, he does not appear to 
.4.,-.,~ ->~A assertive, 
: is this writer's recomendation that Mr. Northern, if he is paroled, be placed in 
supportive environment such as family or friends to make transition to society as 
leventful as possible. It is strongly recomended that, in addition to any mental 
>alth treatment, Mr. Northern receive drug abuse counseling. 
IR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED 
> A FAVORABLE ONE. 
Ted Brandhurst, Ph.D. Al Carlisle, Ph.D. 
sociate Psychologist Chief Clinical Psychologist 
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ADDENDUM J 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 
Number: 3.10 Date: July 14, 1986 Page: 1 of 2 
Title: RESCISSION HEARINGS 
Authority: Utah Code Annotated 77-26-7 
Purpose: To establish a process for the taking of a release or rehearing 
date once it has been set, and to allow for the designation of a 
hearing officer to hear such cases. 
Policy: The release or rehearing date established by ^ the/ Board of 
Pardons shall remain in effect except upon written referral 
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and 
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections 
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would 
present a serious risk or danger to the community. 
Original Issue Date: 8-15-79 Revision Date: 07-14-86 
S765C 
Nunber: 3.10 Date: July 14, 1986 Page: 2 of 2 
Procedure: 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date, information 
shall be provided to the Board establishing the basis for the 
rescission hearing. Upon receipt of such information, the offender 
will be scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circunstances, the offender will be notified of all 
allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at least seven days 
in advance. 
In the event of an escape, the Board will rescind the inmate's date 
upon official notification of escape from custody and continue the 
hearing until the inmate is available for appearance. 
A Board of Pardons hearing officer shall hear all matters when the 
violation consists of a new complaint or conviction for a non-violent 
felony, misdemeanor, or an adjudicated violation of rules or 
regulations. All felonies involving crimes against persons or other 
violent felonies shall be heard by the Board. 
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing and make an interim 
decision to be reviewed, along with a summary report of the hearing, 
by the Board members. Any decision by a hearing officer shall be 
binding and in full force and effect until reviewed by Board members, 
who will make the final decision by approving, modifying, or 
overturning a hearing officer's decision. The decision is then 
entered into the record at a regular scheduled Board meeting and the 
offender is then informed by mail of the results. He is not afforded 





VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
THE STATE OF UTAH PAUL W.SHEFFIELD. 
Administrator BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Consideration of the Status of ^ " Q a l l Q. N o r t h e r n
 > utah State Prison No. J . 609-
The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the day of 








TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE 
5. R-^PE 
6. f l REJ 
SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD 
RESCISSION 
FknrPQ.ll A/Qr-ffonn After the statement of 
1) I 2)_ 
and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision:. 
. and the following witness(es) 
r 
-r-x)-Q3 Rescind 
• Parole to become effective 
• Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions: 
_, 19 JTQ parole date, 





•^3 Rehearing for 
Jft CA f+y* AfprvflC-
, 19 ^ D. for the following reasons: fts* iv 
Q Termination of sentence and parole to become effective 
• Expiration of sentence 
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tt is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found 
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date J u l y 8 _, 1 & affixed my 
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah. Board of Pardons. 
GhM) 
Paul W. 
An application for redetermination may be made after one year from the Board's 




VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL W.SHEFFIELD, 
Administrator 
Consideration of the Status of KENDALL 0 . NORTHERN 
OBSOSNa 99915009 
_, Utah State Prison No. 15009 
The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the 
198 8 for consideration as: 
ORIGINAL HEARING 5. 
REHEARING 6. 
REDETERMINATION 7. 
4. • TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE 
After the statement of 
1). 
6TH day of JULY 
1. 
2. 
SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD 
RESCISSION 
. and the following witness(es) 
.2) . 
and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision: DENY MOTION REQUESTING APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL 
AT SPECIAL ATTENTION HEARING: DENY MOTION OF DISCOVERY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS. 
. ,19 • Rescind 
• Parole to become effective 
• Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions: 
1 . _ 
. parole date, 




• Rehearing for. 
_, 19 , for the following reasons: 
f"l Termination of sentence and parole to become effective. 
• Expiration of sentence 
REMARKS: 
_.19_ 


















It is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found 
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
•TTTT.V fi _, 198 a affixed my 
WHITE COPY-BOARD 
Paul W. Sheffield, Administrator 
An application for redetermination may b 
previous action. Applications may be ot^ N o r t h e r n v B a r n e s e t . a l . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES STONEMAN SMITH, * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 910903060 
The above-entitled matter has come to the Court's attention 
as a result of a referral from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. The case was transferred to this Court to consider the 
petitioner's pro se Petition seeking a "Writ of Habeas 
Corpus". The handwritten Petition was filed April 2, 1991 in 
Millard County* 
On June 7, 1991, the court conducted a prehearing 
conference and set a pretrial conference for June 17, 1991. On 
June 17, 1991, at the pretrial conference, the Court denied the 
State's Motion to Dismiss and referred the natter to Judge Boyd 
Perk of the Fourth District for clarification and preparation 
of an Order specifically stating the amount of 'credit for time 
served* to which petitioner was entitled • A copy of that 
SMITH V. BOARD OF PARDONS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Order, dated the 30th day of October, 1991, is attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A"* 
In Judge Park'* Order, he granted credit to the defendant 
of 626 days of incarceration prior to commitment to the Utah 
State Prison* 
The Court is informed that the Board of Pardons does grant 
credit for time served in many categories of commitment, 
including a 90 day diagnostic evaluation, an evaluation while 
at the Utah State Hospital, custody while financially unable to 
stake bail, retention awaiting parole revocation hearings, and 
other potential holdings, with the single exception of credit 
for jail tine served as a condition of probation. 
In Mr, Smith's case, many of the days served consistent 
vith Judge Park's order of October 30, 1991 should qualify for 
credit within the Board of Pardons' own guidelines yet the 
Board refused to consider the tine (See Exhibits "B", " C and 
"D"), and refused to clarify, if it did consider any credit, 
hov it was considered and applied to this case. 
The Board in a special attention hearing on the 3rd of 
December, 1991, determined to ignore and continues to ignore 
the ruling and commitment of Judge Parks (see Exhibit "D"). 
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When the petitioner was committed to the Utah State Prison 
on September 27, 1989, he bad then served 626 days of his 
commitment* Since the maximum time one may be held on a 0 to 5 
commitment is 1,825 days (365 days times five years), and the 
defendant was given credit for 626 days time served, the 
maximum period in which the petitioner may be subject to the 
concurrent penalties imposed equals 1,199 days, that is 3.28 
years. (1,825 days minus 626 credit ~ 1,199 days/365 « 3.28 
years) 
From the date of commitment, September 27, 1989, to the 
ultimate release date of January 9, 1993, equals 1,199 days. 
That constitutes the total exposure of the petitioner to 
custody on the concurrent penalties imposed by Judge Park* 
The petitioner is now subject to parole release on February 
25, 1992. That is within the period of the maximum exposure of 
the petitioner to custodial retention. It is not clear to the 
Court hov on Exhibit "D", the defendant's exposure on one of 
the cases is to November 20, 1993. Notwithstanding that, the 
Court determines that the interests of the State of Utah and 
the Board of Pardons in the petitioner as a result of these 
concurrent commitments from Judge Parks shall terminate January 
9, 1993. 
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The Court is aware of the case of State V. Dannv Richard*. 
740 P.2d 1314 (6. ct. June, 1987), allowing credit for tine 
served when the defendant vas not able to post bail due to 
indigency. Within that case, Justice Stewart Indicated that 
both the Model Penal Code and the ABA Standards "...would 
grant credit for presentence detention in all cases." In the 
ease of State v. Mark Francis Schr«udarr (S. Ct. December, 
1985), the court stated that "...our sentencing system vests 
almost complete discretion in the Board of pardons to determine 
the period of time that will actually be served. • [at p. 
277], and finally, the Court has reviewed the case of state v. 
Alvlllar. 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988), in which the Court 
said that when the defendant was precluded by statute from the 
right to bail, (because it was alleged that he had committed a 
felony while on probation or parole from another.prior felony), 
that no credit would be approved for time served due to the 
fact that defendant's detention was not for indigency in 
meeting his bail, but rather was due to a statutory preemption 
from bail. 
This entire area of law allows the Board of Pardons to 
engage in discriminatory practices that jeopardizes the 
credibility of the Board and the value of the commitment orders 
of the district courts. Certainly, it is infrequent that one 
would serve as many as 626 days confinement in a third degree 
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felony case before commitment to prison. Due to that fact, and 
as limited to the circumstances of this case alone, the Court 
finds that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a 
further penalty on the defendant than the maximum of five 
years, minus the 626 days served. Certainly, within this outer 
limitation, the Board of Pardons has the ability to determine 
the time in actual custody at the Utah State Prison and/or 
subsequent halfway houses and the period of time on parole, in 
granting this Writ, the Court finds that all the discretionary 
internal date decisions available to the Board of Pardons must 
be within the outer limits set by the sentencing judge. This 
appears consistent with the indeterminate term sentencing 
statutes that have been created by the legislature, and an 
issue of concern such as this could only arise in a sentence 
with a fixed top, such as a second or third degree felony or 
lower offenses.1 
1
 If the Board of Pardons persists in categorically 
denying credit for time served while on probation without 
applying some standard of fairness or discretion to cases 
where, as in this case approximately two years time was served, 
it would seem that the defense bar and the sentencing judge in 
nearly all third degree felonies where the jail time served 
would be beyond six months should be inclined to impose a 0 to 
5 commitment at the Utah State Prison. That sentence would 
require the defendant to serve a few more months on the 
average, but would avoid the exposure of twice serving as much 
as two years, which seems to be the result in this case* 
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Sine* the sentencing judge sets toe outer limits of a 
commitment by imposing the statutory 0 to 5 years for • third 
degree felony, or 1 to 19 for a second degree felony, or 5 to 
life for a first degree felony, the sentencing judge has the 
authority, as done in this case, to set that limit consistent 
with credit. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus should be and the same is herein granted 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision. The maximum exposure 
of the petitioner to the criminal justice system in these 
concurrent offenses is to January 9, 1993. 
This matter is returned to the Board of Pardons to 
implement this ruling and adjust their dates consistent 
herewith. 
Dated this_3~Jz?Iy of February, 1992. 
DAVID s 
DISTRI 
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MAILING CERTIFleiTg 
Z hereby certify that Z Bailed a true end correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this J2A.day of February, 19921 
Charles stoneman Smith 
Petitioner 
•OS. Orange Street 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84116 
Dexter L. Anderson 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
750 S. Highway 99 
Star Route, Box 52 
Fillmore, Ctah 84631 
Utah Attorney General 
6100 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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